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WHERE AMERICA ENDS AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER BEGINS: INTERPRETING THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REACH OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF A 
PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION 
AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS 
Andrew L. Strauss* 
Despite all of the attention given to personal jurisdiction in civil 
cases by the United States Supreme Court, the Court has never ar- 
ticulated a discrete approach to international jurisdiction. Rather, 
in cases with foreign plaintiffs or defendants such as Perkins v. 
Benguet Consolidated Mining CO. ,~  Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,2 Helicopteros Nacionales de Co- 
lombia, S.A. v. Hall,3 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court,4 the Court has approached international jurisdiction as an  
ad hoc appendage to its doctrine of domestic jurisdiction. Specifi- 
cally, the Court, as well as the legal community in general, has as- 
sumed that the U.S. Constitution prescribes America's interna- 
tional jurisdictional reach as if it were prescribing domestic 
jurisdiction among states within the United States. Thus, with mi- 
nor variation,5 the Court applies the constitutionally-derived mini- 
mum contacts test to international cases. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., Woodrow Wilson 
School, Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law. I would like to ex- 
tend my appreciation to my research assistants, Jeanine Clark and Margarita Platkov, for 
their very helpful work on this Article. I also wish to acknowledge my friends and col- 
leagues, Mary Brigid McManamon and Marty Kotler, for their very kind assistance on yet 
another one of my articles. 
1 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
2 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
3 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
4 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
5 See id. a t  115 (noting that  there may be special considerations involved in the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction where issues of foreign policy are implicated). 
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The moment is right for examining this assumption. As the topic 
of this Symposium suggests, the United States and other countries 
are now in the process of negotiating a Hague Convention which 
will prescribe personal jurisdiction in international cases. If the 
Constitution does, in fact, govern the international ambit of the 
United States' jurisdiction in these cases, there is a potential for 
conflict between the Constitution and the treaty. The existence of 
such a potential conflict would lead to  the possibility that the 
treaty, at least in part, would be held invalid by United States 
courts.6 This could both damage U.S. relations with its treaty- 
making partners7 and undermine the treaty's purpose of promoting 
a coordinated and coherent international jurisdictional system. 
Such results would be particularly unfortunate at a time when the 
legal demands of the global economy have amplified the advantages 
of developing and maintaining a well-coordinated international ju- 
risdictional system.8 These advantages are three-fold. 
First, a mutually agreed-upon international jurisdictional system 
is integral to  overcoming existing barriers to the satisfaction of for- 
eign judgments-the major goal of the proposed Hague Convention. 
Clearly, in a world where defendants' assets may not be in the ju- 
risdiction rendering judgment, if judgments cannot be satisfied 
across national borders, the efficacy of the international dispute 
resolution system is greatly impaired. National courts have refused 
to  execute foreign judgments in cases in which they consider the 
foreign court to  have asserted its jurisdiction too broadly.9 There- 
6 For a discussion of potential conflicts, see Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments Conventions 
and Minimum Contacts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1164-73 (1998). 
7 The other members of the Hague Conference, particularly the European membership, 
have become quite frustrated with previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions weakening U.S. 
adherence to Hague treaty regimes. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 
U.S. 694, 707-08 (1988) (holding that service of process on an  overseas defendant does not 
have to be in accordance with the Hague Convention on overseas service of process); SociBtB 
Nationale Industrielle ABrospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987) 
(holding that the Hague Convention does not require resort to its procedures concerning dis- 
covery). See generally Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague 
Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1300 (1998) (giving voice to the 
European frustrations). 
8 See Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International 
Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 423 (1995) 
(concluding that an  international jurisdictional system is necessary, given the "transnational 
economic and social interaction that has accompanied the rise of the global economy"). 
9 For a discussion of national court refusal to recognize foreign court judgments deemed 
too broad, see Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 
GA. J .  INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 22-23 (1987); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J .  COMP. L. 1, 13 (1988); see also BIN 
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fore, the greater the uniformity of principles of jurisdiction that can 
be agreed upon, the greater the range of cases about which the par- 
ties negotiating the proposed Hague Convention can reach agree- 
ment to  require states to  satisfy foreign judgments. 
Second, a successfully functioning treaty regime would help re- 
duce opportunities for forum shopping. If nations maintain the 
ability to  determine their own jurisdictional realms autonomously 
while simultaneously failing to  apply uniform choice of law rules, 
the outcome of cases will depend upon plaintiffs finding the forum 
that applies the most pro-plaintiff substantive law. This frustrates 
the goal of legal predictability and continues an international sys- 
tem which does not have the ability to  coordinate which state's laws 
should apply in a given situation. A treaty-based system of inter- 
national jurisdictional rules, while unlikely to  eliminate the poten- 
tial for forum shopping completely, would provide that it only occur 
to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the intended function- 
ing of an ordered international system. 
Third, such a treaty could correct the discriminatory way in 
which American citizens are subjected to  overly-broad assertions of 
jurisdiction by European countries. These countries are already 
parties to  a European jurisdiction and satisfaction of judgments 
treaty regime,lo under which principles of jurisdiction are well- 
defined.11 The Convention, however, requires that parties enforce 
judgments of other signatory states against domiciliaries of non- 
CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
259-61 (1987). 
10 See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), as 
amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter 
Brussels Convention]. The parties to the Brussels Convention were the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and the original six Member Countries of the European Union. See id.  a t  tit. 11, 
art. 3. The Brussels Convention was further modified by the Lugano Convention. See Con- 
vention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) (entered into force Jan.  
1, 1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. The Lugano Convention extended the basic obli- 
gations of the Brussels Convention to relations among Members of the European Union as  
well as those in the European Free Trade Association. For commentary on the significance 
of both Conventions and the relationship between them, see Richard G. Fentiman, Jurisdic- 
tion, Discretion and the Brussels Convention, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 85-94 (1993) 
(providing a broad discussion of the jurisdiction issue); Robert C. Reuland, The Recognition of 
Judgments in the European Community: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Brussels Con- 
vention, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 559, 589-90 (1993) (explaining the operation of the Brussels 
Convention's provisions on recognition of judgments). 
11 See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, a t  tit. 11; Lugano Convention, supra note 10, a t  
tit. 11. 
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party states like the United States even when those judgments re- 
sult from domestic assertions of jurisdiction that are far broader 
than the limitations prescribed as between treaty parties.l2 Spe- 
cifically relevant are Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code 
which permit French courts to  assert jurisdiction over foreign na- 
tionals whenever a French national is either a plaintiff or defen- 
dant in a suit.13 Thus, if I, as an American domiciliary, am alleged 
to have committed a torti4 in the United States against a French 
citizen, under the terms of the treaty, I could be sued in France. 
Likewise, German law provides that if the defendant has any prop- 
erty in Germany, then German courts would have unlimited per- 
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant.15 If I, therefore, happen t o  
own a few shares of stock in German corporations,l6 German courts 
could assert unlimited personal jurisdiction over me. Moreover, 
British courts would be required to honor such a French or German 
judgment against any British assets that I might have. 
Finally, although rare, the present lack of a coordinated treaty 
regime also allows for negative conflicts of jurisdiction where no 
state has the authority or willingness to  assert jurisdiction over a 
dispute.17 A treaty regime could coordinate jurisdictional responsi- 
- - -- - 
12 See Brussels Convention, supra note 10, a t  tit. I11 (providing for discriminatory en- 
forcement against non-party countries). 
13 Article 14 states that  "[a] foreigner, even if not residing in France, may be cited before 
French courts for the execution of obligations by him contracted in France with a French- 
man; he may be brought before the courts of France for obligations by him contracted in for- 
eign countries towards Frenchmen." THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 14 (John H. Crabb trans., 
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995). Article 15 further provides that  "[a] Frenchman may be 
brought before a court of France for obligations by him contracted in a foreign country, even 
with a foreigner." Id. a t  art. 15. 
14 The language of Article 14, see supra note 13, has been liberally interpreted to apply to 
torts. See Judgment of Dec. 13, 1842 (Comp. Du Britannia v. Comp. Du Phenix), Cass. req., 
1843 [S. Jur.  I1 14 (Fr.). 
15 See $ 23 Nr. 3 ZPO (Zivilprozepordnung). 
16 See Brian Pearce, The Comity Doctrine as  a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U.S.-  
E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J .  INT'L L. 525, 565 (1994) ("[Iln Germany and the countries in- 
fluenced by the ZivilproceSordnung . . . unlimited judicial jurisdiction may be premised on 
the presence of even trifling or intangible assets . . . ."); see also Arthur Taylor von Mehren, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and 
Current Practice in the European Economic Community and the United States, 8 1  COLUM. L. 
REV. 1044, 1049 (1981) (discussing the broad "any assets" basis for jurisdiction under the 
German Code of Civil Procedure). 
17 See Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 232 RECUEIL DES 
COURS, [R.C.A.D.I.] 201, 204 (1992) (stating that "[tlhe authority of each State to decide on 
jurisdictional competence can and often will lead to positive and negative conflicts of jurisdic- 
tion"); see also H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the International Court of  Justice Is 
Dependent Upon the Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A Metadiscourse, 20 
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1479, 1500-01 (1997). 
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bilities so that some forum would always be available to  hear any 
legitimate dispute. 
Because the advantages of participating in a coordinated jurisdic- 
tional system are significant, it would be unfortunate if the Consti- 
tution were to  be interpreted to  stand in the way of their realiza- 
tion. I do not believe that such an interpretation is required. My 
thesis is that the Framers of the Constitution understood interna- 
tional jurisdiction between the nation-states of the world to  be allo- 
cated by the international order, and only meant the Constitution 
to prescribe domestic jurisdiction among the fifty states within the 
United States and between those states and the federal system. I 
have argued elsewhere that consistency with the paradigm of state 
sovereignty (which provides the conceptual foundation for the in- 
ternational system), requires that the global order define the ambit 
of nation-state jurisdiction.18 In this Article, I argue that this para- 
digmatic approach is specifically embodied in the United States 
Constitution. 
To set the stage, Part 1.A discusses the basic principles used by 
American courts to  determine which law is applicable when domes- 
tic and international law are in conflict.lg With this background in 
mind, Part 1.B turns to  the specific problem of how an American 
court would resolve a conflict between a treaty governing interna- 
tional jurisdiction and U.S. law, particularly the Constitution.20 
Part 1.B closes by explaining why constitutional provisions would 
be considered supreme over provisions of a jurisdictional treaty. 
The remainder of the Article explains that no such conflict should 
be seen to  exist since the Constitution does not prescribe interna- 
tional jurisdiction. The foundation for this argument is laid out in 
Part 1I.A where I identify the fundamental constitutional principles 
for determining where U.S. constitutional law ends and interna- 
tional law begins.21 My claim is that these principles, derived from 
the basic paradigm of state sovereignty, provide that domestic law 
regulates private actors and the state's internal organs of admini- 
stration, while international law regulates relations between na- 
tion-states. Part 1I.B applies these principles to jurisdiction.22 Af- 
ter briefly defining jurisdiction as being about the allocation of 
1s See generally Strauss, supra note 8, a t  373. 
19 See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. 
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authority between constituent units of an organizational system, 
Part 1I.B broadly demonstrates that while the Constitution pre- 
scribes jurisdiction among the fifty states of the United States, it 
defers to international law to prescribe jurisdiction among the na- 
tion-states of the world. Part 1II.A conducts a brief historical re- 
view of cases to  show that this was well understood during the "era 
of territorial jurisdiction."23 Part 1II.B discusses the transition t o  
the present era of contacts jurisdiction, and explains that contacts 
jurisdiction has obscured the basic purpose of jurisdiction. As a re- 
sult, people today erroneously assume that the constitution gov- 
erns international jurisdiction.24 Contacts jurisdiction has come to 
be viewed as not about allocating authority among states, but about 
protecting the rights of defendants from over-assertions of author- 
ity by the state, a subject that can easily be misconstrued as a mat- 
ter for domestic regulation.25 The Article explains how contacts ju- 
risdiction has appeared to  lose its jurisdictional function both 
because it allows for states to  have overlapping jurisdictional 
realms, and because the Supreme Court, in proclaiming the domes- 
tic doctrine of contacts jurisdiction, resorted to  a formulation which 
denied that the doctrine affected the allocation of authority between 
states. 
I. RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Doctrine of Dualism 
The usual starting point for resolving conflicts between domestic 
legal doctrine and international treaty law is the doctrine of dual- 
ism as it has been adopted in the United States.26 Dualism posits 
that domestic (or "municipal law," as it is often called) and interna- 
tional law are two completely separate systems of l a ~ . ~ 7  As such, 
each has its own law making, enforcement, and adjudication sys- 
23 See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 84-122 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text. 
26 See George Slyz, International Law in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J .  INT'L L. & POL. 65,  
67 (1996) (discussing the doctrine of dualism). 
27 See id.  (stating that "dualism regards international law and the internal law of states 
as wholly separate legal systems"). 
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tems.28 American courts, as agents of the American system, are 
limited to  applying American law. By long-standing authority, 
however, "[ilnternational law is part of our law,"29 and when appro- 
priate, it is incorporated into, or becomes a part of, American fed- 
eral law.30 In fact, Article VI of the United States Constitution de- 
fines "treaties" along with the Constitution itself as the "supreme 
Law of the Land."S1 
As the equivalent of federal law, in the event of a conflict between 
the requirements of a treaty and requirements imposed by other 
federal, state, or constitutional edicts, treaty law is subject to the 
same rules of precedence as federal legislation.32 It is supreme (for 
most, if not all, purposes) to  state l a ~ . ~ 3  In relation to  federal leg- 
islation, it is subject to  the later-in-time rule, which holds that a 
subsequently passed federal law takes precedence over an earlier 
passed one.34 Finally, in the words of the Restatement, "provisions 
of international agreements of the United States are subject to  the 
Bill of Rights and other prohibitions, restrictions, and requirements 
28 See id .  ("[Rlules of international law apply within a state only by virtue of their incor- 
poration into the state's internal law. They are binding, in other words, as rules of internal 
law and not international law.") (footnote omitted). 
2.9 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1) (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] (stating that "[ilnternational law and international 
agreements of the United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of 
the several States"). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con- 
trary notwithstanding. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
32 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (asserting the legal hierarchy of 
treaty law and other international agreements over state law). 
33 The application of international law in American courts, similar to federal law, may be 
subject to any reservations of power that the Tenth Amendment to the United States Consti- 
tution reserves exclusively for the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not dele- 
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by i t  to the States, are  re- 
served to the States respectively, or to the people."). Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920), was, however, dismissive of Tenth Amendment limits on treaty 
powers. The door, however, may not be entirely closed. See Jeffrey L. Friesen, Note, The 
Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations: Thoughts on the 
American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1422 (1994) (stating that  
"Missouri v. Holland . . . does Cnotl make the Tenth Amendment a nullity"). 
34 See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, 5 115. For further discussion 
of the rule, see JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 81-101 
(1996). 
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of the Constitution, and cannot be given effect in violation of 
them."35 
B. Personal Jurisdiction and Domestic Law 
How does all of this relate to personal jurisdiction? Personal ju- 
risdiction in the United States is understood narrowly as a question 
of constitutional law. This suggests that our inquiry should be 
limited to  an analysis of the relationship between the Constitution 
and the proposed Hague Convention.s6 Jurisdiction in the final 
sense is, however, a question of which forum ultimately hears a 
dispute. Our discussion must therefore be expanded, a t  least 
briefly, to  include the relationship between the proposed convention 
and the whole body of law which identifies the presiding forum. 
American forums may at their discretion establish rules and pro- 
cedures which allow them to decline to  exercise their constitutional 
grant of jurisdiction.37 Some state forums within the United States 
employ "long-arm" statutes which may serve to  limit cases that 
state courts may hear.38 Federal district courts use the long-arm 
statutes of the states in which they sit in diversity cases and in fed- 
eral question cases where there are no specific federal long-arm 
provisions.39 In addition, each state and the federal government 
maintain additional rules of venue which direct cases to those 
courts within the forum which are geographically most convenient. 
Finally, the federal system and many states employ transfer doc- 
trine40 as well as the doctrine of forum non c~nveniens .~~  These 
35 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, 5 111 cmt. A; see Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of 
the Constitution over a treaty.") (footnote omitted). 
36 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 70 (4th ed. 1996) ("Because the federal 
Constitution defines the lines of authority among the competing centers of power, courts look 
to the Constitution for their basic framework in deciding issues of judicial jurisdiction. . . . 
[Wlhat we now call personal jurisdiction [is] part of the Constitution."). 
37 See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CML PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 23-24 (2d 
ed. 1992). 
38 See id .  a t  24-28 (discussing the use of long-arm statutes by the states). 
39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k) (specifying the jurisdictional reach of federal courts); see also 
MYRNA S .  RAEDER, FEDERAL PRETRIAL PRACTICE 5 4-13(a), a t  110-11 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining 
that in the absence of a federal statute which provides otherwise, federal courts apply the 
jurisdictional laws of the state in which the court sits). 
40 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 5 1404. 
41 See RAEDER, supra note 39, at  119-23 (discussing the doctrine of forum non conveni- 
ens); see also Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the Doctrine of 
Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, 16 LOY. 
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doctrines allow judges to transfer cases to  other courts within the 
forum or dismiss the case so that it can be refiled in another forum 
if it would be more convenient for the case to be heard elsewhere.42 
Because the American dualist approach to domestic incorporation 
of international law views treaties as supreme to  earlier-in-time 
federal law as well as most state law,43 the only question meriting 
serious exploration is the possibility that an international jurisdic- 
tional treaty would be superseded by conflicting American constitu- 
tional principles of jurisdiction. Approached as a matter of consti- 
tutional interpretation, the question turns on understanding the 
allocation of law making authority between the domestic and inter- 
national orders reflected in the Constitution. 
11. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 
A. The Sovereignty Paradigm and the U.S.  Constitution 
Finding the answer to  the question of whether the Constitution is 
meant t o  prescribe international jurisdiction lies in understanding 
the intellectual universe in which the architects of the Constitution 
were operating. In this universe, the distribution of all global po- 
litical power, including the extent to  which the authority of nation- 
states yields to  the authority of the international system, is derived 
from the paradigm of state ~overeignty.~~ Under the classic formu- 
lation of the sovereignty paradigm, the state is the ultimate and 
supreme political entity within its jurisdictional sphere.45 As such, 
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 455, 460-76 (1994) (discussing the historical development of the doc- 
trine of forum non conveniens in the United States). 
42 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (identifying and discussing 
factors of convenience); see also J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chem. of Canada, Ltd., 331 F. 
Supp. 1215, 1220-22 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (dismissing an action by an American corporation 
against a Canadian corporation on forum non conveniens grounds). 
43 See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between treaty 
law and federal and state law). 
44 For a comprehensive discussion of the history of sovereignty, see generally EDWIN 
DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1920). For additional 
discussion, see Strauss, supra note 8, a t  391-93 (discussing the history of the paradigm of 
state sovereignty and indentifying specific ways in which the paradigm is qualified by mod- 
ern developments). 
45 The concept of sovereignty denotes jurisdictional control. For a discussion of the con- 
nection between sovereignty and jurisdiction, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries 
on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 16-17 (1935). For a 
discussion of the general principles of international jurisdiction, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S IN- 
TERNATIONAL LAW § 169, a t  564 & n.1 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 
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all private, non-state actors46 coming within a state's jurisdictional 
sphere, as well as the state's own internal organs of administration, 
are subject to the absolute exercise47 of that state's domestic 
authority. What is left to  the international order under this para- 
digm is to govern relations between these sovereign political enti- 
ties.48 
Because state sovereignty despite certain qualifications49 contin- 
ues to be the basic organizing principle of the international system, 
most of us continue to  accept implicitly its basic allocation of re- 
sponsibility between the domestic and international orders. High- 
way speed limits are decided domestically.50 Laws regulating the 
rules of international armed conflict are the province of the interna- 
tional order. While rarely stated explicitly, the allocation of re- 
sponsibility is implicit throughout the entire constitution. The 
document's first three Articles establish the basic framework for in- 
ternal self-governance. They do not attempt to  establish a regula- 
tory structure for the world at  large.51 Article I establishes a legis- 
lative branch with powers vested in "a Congress of the United 
States"52 to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
1992), and Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered: The Jurisdictional Nihilism of 
the Supreme Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209, 1211-13 
(1994) (discussing the connection between sovereignty, territoriality, and jurisdiction). 
46 Today, under the well-accepted restrictive form of foreign sovereign immunity, foreign 
states that enter the jurisdictional realm of their fellow states (to engage in private com- 
merce, for example) will often be subject to the domestic authority of local courts. See gener- 
ally Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. Q Q  1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 
1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994); CHARLES LEWIS, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (1980). 
47 Modern developments qualify the absolute nature of this authority. See Strauss, supra 
note 8, at  393 & n.71 (noting limitations on the absolute authority of states to regulate the 
conduct of private actors, particularly in the area of human rights). 
48 Public international organizations, formally created by states, have in reality become 
increasingly autonomous and today should probably also be themselves considered inde- 
pendent subjects of international governance. See id.  a t  393 & n.72. 
49 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
50 The sovereignty paradigm does not distinguish as between levels of government within 
the domestic order. Although a t  times influenced by the federal government, the states 
within the United States establish highway speed limits within their boundaries. 
51 The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution identifies "[wle the People of the United States," 
as  those attempting to form, "a more perfect Union," (quite clearly between the states within 
the United States), and that "this Constitution for the United States of America" was 
"ordain[ed] and establish[edI7' to "establish Justice [apparently within the American system], 
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, 
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
(emphasis added). 
52 Id. a t  art. I ,  Q 1 (emphasis added). 
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the United States."53 Article I1 establishes the executive powers of 
the United States,5* the office of President to be held only by a natu- 
ral born citizen of the United States.55 Article I11 establishes the 
"judicial Power of the United States,"56 which "extend[s] to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws 
of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their Authority."57 
As a framework for internal governance, the document functions to 
allocate power among the fifty states of the Union and between 
those fifty states and the federal government, not among the na- 
tion-states of the global community.58 For example, the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of Article IV requires that "[flull Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and 
judicial Proceedings of every other State."59 Thus, the Constitution 
establishes the deference in certain matters that the fifty states 
within the Union owe to each other. Nowhere does the Constitution 
purport to establish similar reciprocal obligations upon the nation- 
states of the world. Defining such reciprocal obligations between 
the nation-states of the world, it is well-established, is the province 
of international law.60 Likewise, it is clear, from the context of Ar- 
ticle 111's identification of the limited subject matter jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court and other federal courts to be established, that 
Article I11 provides an alternative to the courts of the fifty states 
53 Id. a t  art. I, 5 8 (emphasis added). These are among the list of enumerated powers spe- 
cifically identified in Section 8. 
54 See id .  a t  art .  11, § 1 (vesting executive power in the President of the United States). 
55 See id.  a t  art. 11, 5 1, cl. 5 (outlining the eligibility requirements of citizenship, age, and 
residency for the office of President). 
56 Id. a t  art. 111, 5 1 (emphasis added) (providing for one Supreme Court and "such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish"). 
57 Id. a t  art. 111, 9 2 (emphasis added). 
58 See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United 
States, 101 U .  PA. L. REV. 26, 45 (1953) (noting that the Framers of the Constitution were 
extremely well-schooled in international law, and describing the Constitution as a charter of 
authority, allocating jurisdiction between the different branches of the distinct national and 
state authorities in order to achieve, in part, the essential constitutional objective of paving a 
"way to nationhood-'one nation firmly hooped together' with respect to everything exter- 
nal") (citation omitted). 
59 U.S. CONST. art. IV, 5 1. 
60 That the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applies only between indi- 
vidual states of the United States has never been in question. The satisfaction of judgments 
between courts of different nation-states is determined in accordance with international 
principles of comity. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of For- 
eign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1607 (1968) 
(discussing inherent differences between American and international practice). See generally 
Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991) (exploring meanings 
and origins of comity in international law). 
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within the United States, and is not intended to allocate authority 
between courts within the United States and those within foreign 
c ~ u n t r i e s . ~ ~  
The implied general distinction between an inner-realm under 
the domain of the Constitution and an outer-realm under the do- 
main of the international order surfaces in Article 11, Section 2, 
which establishes the treaty-making power of the Executive and the 
Senate.62 By providing a process for internal ratification of the ex- 
ternal obligations undertaken by the United States, the Constitu- 
tion manifests the Framers' understanding that the document is 
meant to  establish a structural framework for American self- 
regulation, and that the country is only one of many participants in 
a separate international law making system whose domain is rela- 
tions among nation-states. 
To the extent that the above analysis leaves any room for doubt 
about whether the Constitution's Framers intended that American 
constitutional law should be interpreted as requiring the United 
States to  violate a jurisdiction treaty, canons of American legal con- 
struction require that such doubt be resolved in favor of consistency 
with the treaty.63 
- - -- -- -- - -- - -- - 
61 According to Article 111, the judicial power of the national authority was to "be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as  the Congress may from time to time or- 
dain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1. Article 111, Section 2 enumerates specific areas 
of subject matter jurisdiction for the exercise of national, as opposed to state, judicial power. 
See id. a t  art. 111, 5 2. Alexander Hamilton specifically addressed the way in which judicial 
authority to resolve disputes with foreign implications should be allocated among American 
courts: 
The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its mem- 
bers . . . . So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve na- 
tional questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in 
which they are concerned to the national tribunals. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, a t  536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961). 
62 The President: 
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments. 
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2. 
63 In a n  often-cited opinion, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "an act of congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction re- 
mains." Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United 
States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with a n  inter- 
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All of this analysis merely makes explicit what is implied in un- 
dertaking to  draft a constitution for the United States: that the 
Framers incorporated into the Constitution their understanding of 
where America ends and the international order begins. 
B. The Constitutionally Accepted Sovereignty Paradigm and 
Personal Jurisdiction 
How does this constitutionally reflected allocation of responsibil- 
ity apply to  personal jurisdiction? An elemental understanding of 
personal jurisdiction unencumbered by the highly particularized 
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject64 reveals that 
personal jurisdiction, like all jurisdiction, is about the allocation of 
administrative authority between subunits of an organizational 
system.65 The concept is so basic that without it, anything but 
small-scale social organization would be impossible.66 There simply 
would be no way to  determine which administrative subunits of an 
organization have the responsibility for exercising authority in 
which areas.67 Chaos would ensue.68 
Consistent with the basic concept of jurisdiction, subunits cannot 
self-define their own jurisdiction.69 Our own federal system makes 
national agreement of the United States."); id .  $ 401 cmt. b (observing that domestic law is 
generally construed to avoid conflict with international law). While this rule generally ap- 
plies to statutes, logically the Constitution should likewise be construed as  consistent with 
international law, unless it also clearly indicates to the contrary. 
64 See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's devel- 
opment of contacts jurisdiction). 
65 A Dictionary of the Social Sciences explains: 
The term jurisdiction denotes the sphere of authority exercised by a state, agency of the 
state, international juridical or administrative organization, or a non-governmental as- 
sociation, over places, persons, or things. In international law it includes the general 
authority recognized as belonging to a state or to a n  international agency, and the par- 
ticular authority recognized in national law as  belonging to an agency of government or 
to a statutory or voluntary non-governmental association. 
A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 360 (Julius Gould & William L. Kolb eds., 1964); see 
Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U .  
PA. L. REV. 781, 788 (1985) (stating that "personal jurisdiction represents an allocation of 
judicial power among different sovereign jurisdictions"). 
66 See Strauss, supra note 45, a t  1215 (discussing the impossibility of organizing global 
social life without jurisdictional authority). 
67 See id .  (describing the need to have jurisdiction in order to allocate regulatory respon- 
sibility among administrative units). 
68 See id .  (concluding that "there would be no way to accomplish effectively the intricate 
and myriad tasks necessary for governing a modern complex society"). 
69 See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 
957 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & Ephraim Fischoff et  al. trans., Univ. of Califor- 
nia 1978) (1968) ("The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic 
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this obvious. If Louisiana was charged with deciding its own juris- 
diction, there would be no jurisdictional constraints on Louisiana. 
In a hypothetical federal system of jurisdictional self-prescription, 
Louisiana and every other state could exercise regulatory authority 
in whatever area they pleased, and the fundamental organizational 
purpose of jurisdiction would be defeated. 
If self-prescription is inconsistent with the premise underlying 
jurisdiction, then the allocation of jurisdictional responsibilities be- 
tween the nation-states of the world must be left to  the interna- 
tional order. Under the constitutionally-reflected sovereignty para- 
digm, international jurisdiction cannot be a matter for domestic 
regulation, but rather, as a question necessarily involving relations 
between nation-states, it is a classic subject for prescription by the 
international order. The Constitution, therefore, must intend itself 
to  prescribe the jurisdictional responsibilities of the fifty states 
within the United States and the federal government and leave the 
allocation of jurisdiction among the nation-states of the world to  the 
international order. 
As I will now demonstrate, that the Constitution is not meant to 
extend into the realm of prescribing international jurisdiction was 
taken for granted during the era of territorial jurisdiction. 
111. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY-ACCEPTED SOVEREIGNTY 
PARADIGM TO INTERNATIONAL C SES 
A. Easy Application: The Era of Territorial Jurisdiction 
During the era of territorial jurisdiction (predating the founding 
of the United States and ending definitively in 1945),70 the courts, 
- -  
structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as  in large party organizations and 
private enterprises. It  does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its author- 
ity is called 'private' or 'public."'); see also AMA MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK § 1, a t  16-17, 41 
(Russell F. Moore ed., 1970) (emphasizing that establishing a hierarchy of "authority, power, 
decision making and administering" is essential to the achievement of organizational goals, 
and asserting that, whether delegation of authority results in decentralized or centralized 
formal structure, a central source for guidance and authority is required for organizational 
coherence and to avoid organizational "chaos"); PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE 
CORPORATION 30-54 (1946) (maintaining that central authority, which defines the delegation 
of power and the corresponding role of constituent units in any centralized or decentralized 
organizational structure, is vital to administrative efficiency and to long-term survival of an  
institution). 
70 The Supreme Court formally brought a n  end to the era of territorial jurisdiction when 
it explicitly articulated the new minimum contacts standard for asserting personal jurisdic- 
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and the legal community in general, assumed that the U.S. Consti- 
tution's role was not to  prescribe personal jurisdiction in interna- 
tional cases. Rather, in assuming that the limits of nation-state ju- 
risdiction came from the international order, courts during this 
period took for granted that our Constitution was not intended to  
upset the allocation of responsibility between the domestic and in- 
ternational orders implied by the sovereignty paradigm. 
The hallmark of the territorial era was an understanding that 
nation-states possessed absolute sovereignty over their territories 
and conversely were excluded from exercising sovereign powers in 
the territories of other nation-states.71 It followed that a nation- 
state only had personal jurisdiction over a defendant who was in- 
side of its own territo~-y.72 A state asserted this jurisdiction by 
physically seizing or arresting the defendant.73 Eventually the sys- 
tem evolved to  allow symbolic seizure of the defendant through 
service of process.74 That in this simple jurisdictional world the 
Constitution was not intended to  claim authority to  prescribe 
whether the United States could assert personal jurisdiction over 
someone who was in another country was taken as obvious by the 
legal community, which assumed implicitly the sovereignty para- 
digm's division of domestic from international responsibility. 
So straightforward was the territorial formula and so clear was 
its international function of allocating power among nation-states 
- - -- -- - -- 
tion in the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra Part 
1II.B. 1 (discussing International Shoe and the minimum contacts standard). For a very good 
discussion of territorial jurisdiction, see generally Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory 
Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279 (1983). 
71 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-09 (4th ed. 1990). 
For a discussion which is somewhat more detailed than that provided in this Article, see 
Strauss, supra note 8, a t  394-95. 
72 This understanding is reflected in the classic American decision which defined the ter- 
ritorial era, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.  714 (1877), which stated: 
[Nlo State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property with- 
out its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the inde- 
pendence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is laid down by 
jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside 
of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by 
it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property 
to its decisions. 
Id.  a t  722 (citations omitted). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. ,  A General Theory of State- 
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 258-62 (arguing that  the territorial concept of 
jurisdiction never worked very well and was invented by Justice Joseph Story with little ba- 
sis in precedent). 
7 3  See International Shoe, 326 U.S.  a t  316. 
74 See id .  (observing that the power to arrest by virtue of what was called a writ of capias 
ad respondendum had "given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice"). 
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that no one would have assumed that it was a creation of our own 
Constitution. In fact, quite the opposite was the case. Courts ex- 
plicitly reported their understanding that the international order 
governed jurisdiction between nation-states in their attempts to  de- 
rive an analogous system of jurisdiction for the parallel community 
of states within the United States. 
Pennoyer v. Neff,75 the 1877 case which, in many people's minds, 
exemplifies the territorial era, provides the most famous such ref- 
erence. In that case, the Court needed an authoritative basis to 
justify its use of the territorial approach to allocating judicial pow- 
ers among the "sovereign" states of the American federation. The 
Court found such a basis in the "well-established principles of pub- 
lic [international] law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent 
[nation-]State over persons and property."76 
Many other nineteenth-century cases also stand as evidence of 
the implied presumption that the international order prescribes the 
jurisdiction of nation-states. For example, in the 1828 case of Pic- 
quet v. Swan,77 the former Federal Circuit Court for the District of 
Massachusetts proclaimed: 
[tlhe courts of a state, however general may be their juris- 
diction, are necessarily confined to  the territorial limits of 
the state. Their process cannot be executed beyond those 
limits; and any attempt to  act upon persons or things beyond 
them, would be deemed an usurpation of foreign sovereignty, 
not justified or acknowledged by the Law of nations.78 
Likewise in 1848, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in holding that 
Georgia could not assert personal jurisdiction over a resident of 
South Carolina, reported its understanding that "the rule is firmly 
fixed, that no sovereignty can extend its process beyond its territorial 
Limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. 
This is the rule, by the laws of nations-by the Common Law, and 
75 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
76 Id. a t  722. Justice Field concludes: 
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many 
of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the gov- 
ernment created by the Constitution. But, except as  restrained and limited by that in- 
strument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the prin- 
ciples of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these 
principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over per- 
sons and property within its territory. 
Id. 
77 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134). 
78 Id. a t  611 (emphasis added). 
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[it] is recognized by the  American Courts."79 Additionally, i n  1850 
in  D'Arcy u. Ketchum,80 the  Supreme Court itself, anticipating its 
decision i n  Pennoyer, made reference to the international order's 
prescription of international jurisdiction.81 Holding that an Ameri- 
can state could refuse to give effect to  a sister American state's 
judgment on the basis of a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the Court 
proclaimed that, "[wle deem it to be free from controversy that 
these adjudications a re  in  conformity to the well-established rules 
of international law, regulating governments foreign to each 
other."s2 Many other cases of the e ra  evidenced a similar under- 
standing.83 
With the rise of contacts jurisdiction, however, this simple terri- 
torial model of jurisdiction would lose its viability, and with it 
79 Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 515 (1848). 
80 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850). 
81 See id.  a t  174 (discussing the limits of nation-state jurisdiction as  established under the 
rules of international law). 
82 Id. 
83 Other cases during the era of territorial jurisdiction also evidence the implied presump- 
tion that the international order prescribes the jurisdiction of nation-states. See Wildenhus's 
Case, 120 U.S. 1, 19 (1887) (citing a French case for the proposition tha t  "'every state has 
sovereign jurisdiction throughout its territory"') (citation omitted); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517, 589 (1839) (analogizing American states to nations for jurisdictional 
purposes); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (finding that a Massa- 
chusetts court had no jurisdiction over a resident of Connecticut); Peckham v. North Parish 
in Haverhill, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 274, 286 (1834) (holding that corporations established under 
a foreign state are beyond the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts); M'Queen v. Middletown 
Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 4, 7 (N.Y. 1819) (holding that jurisdiction does not attach to a corporation 
outside the sovereignty where that corporation's body exists); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261, 
284 (Pa. 1788); Campbell v. Wilson, 6 Tex. 379, 391 (1851) (stating that,  from "'an interna- 
tional point of view, jurisdiction, to be rightfully exercised, must be founded on the per- 
son . . . or the thing being within the territory"') (citation omitted); see also Max Rheinstein, 
The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 782 n.23 (1955) (discussing 
cases which address territorial limits on judicial power in reference to judgments); id.  a t  783 
n.28 (discussing cases which address territorial limits on the state power to grant divorces); 
id. a t  783 n.29 (discussing cases which address territorial limits on the state power to tax); 
id. a t  783 n.30, 784 n.31 (discussing cases which address the state power to legislate). 
Patrick Borchers, based upon his review of early personal jurisdiction cases, has concluded 
that courts prior to Pennoyer consistently applied the international territorial principles of 
personal jurisdiction. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Per- 
sonal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 
25-32 (1990) (summarizing the relevant cases). 
John Drobak, based upon his own research, has similarly concluded: 
Under the principles of international law as understood by these American courts, one 
country did not have authority aver the citizens of another unless they or their property 
were within the borders of the country. The courts used this concept of governmental 
territorial authority as the basis for rules of personal jurisdiction. 
John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1022 
(1983); see id .  a t  1019-25 (summarizing the relevant cases). 
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would go the clarity of understanding that made the application of 
international law to international cases appear so natural. 
I will now turn to  explaining how courts and commentators came 
to  misunderstand the nature of jurisdiction during the contacts era, 
and how this misunderstanding led to  the assumption that domes- 
tic jurisdictional principles should be applied in international cases. 
B. The Conundrum of Contacts Analysis 
1. The Conversion to  Contacts 
In 1945, the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washing- 
tons4 brought the era of territorial jurisdiction to an end.85 In that 
case, which presented a question regarding the jurisdiction of a 
state within the United States, the Supreme Court explicitly en- 
dorsed what came to be identified as the minimum contacts test. 
The Court proclaimed that: 
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defen- 
dant to  a judgment in  personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum con- 
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus- 
tice. 
Commentators generally agree that economic developments 
forced the Supreme Court to  make the transition from territoriality 
84 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
85 When I speak of the end of the era of territorial jurisdiction it should not be taken to 
mean that  territoriality as  the primary basis for jurisdiction ended in 1945, but only that  
personal jurisdiction was no longer strictly limited to the forum where the defendant was 
territorially present. In fact, the analysis which follows relies on the prevailing assumption 
underlying Supreme Court opinions that the Court does not have the independent power to 
expand the basis for state jurisdiction beyond territoriality. 
86 International Shoe, 326 U.S. a t  316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)). Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has continued to refine the minimum 
contacts doctrine in numerous cases. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Heli- 
copteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Maga- 
zine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); 
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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to  contacts jurisdiction.S7 Most significant was the increasing num- 
ber of corporate defendantsa8 which made reliance on the defen- 
dant's presence within the forum as the sine qua non for the exer- 
cise of state power no longer possible.89 As the facts in International 
Shoe itself made clear,go while the corporation is metaphorically 
deemed to  be a person, it is in reality a legal "fiction" composed of a 
multitude of many different persons all performing different func- 
tions. The entity, therefore, has no physical presence, much less 
one in a particular jurisdiction. Should the entity be deemed "to be" 
where it was formally incorporated, where its board of directors sat, 
where its owners (the shareholders) were, where its workers were, 
or where its customers were? Without a satisfactory answer to 
these questions, the courts were forced to change the basis for ju- 
87 See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 
257, 343-44 (1990) (discussing the factors that lead to the demise of territorial jurisdiction). 
88 In 1932, in their very influential work of the day, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means wrote of the tremendous growth 
in corporations: 
Thus, in field after field, the corporation has entered, grown, and become wholly or par- 
tially dominant. The date of its appearance and the degree of its dominance have in 
general varied with two factors, the public character of the activity in question and the 
amount of fured capital necessary to carry on business. I t  came first in the fields of 
public utilities, common carriers, banks and insurance companies (which even in the 
1840's were conceded to perform public functions) and last in  the areas of personal 
service and agriculture . . . On the basis of its development in the past we may look for- 
ward to a time when practically all economic activity will be carried on under the corpo- 
rate form. 
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
17 (rev. ed. 1982) (footnote omitted). 
89 In  addition to the rise in corporate defendants, other social, economic, and technological 
changes contributed to making the territorial approach to jurisdiction anachronistic. For 
example, commentators frequently point to the rising popularity of automobiles. See id.  
Under the strict territorial approach to jurisdiction, drivers could commit a tort in  one state, 
drive out of state before the victim could arrange for process to be served, and thereby shield 
themselves from suit. 
90 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. a t  313-14. In International Shoe, the state of Wash- 
ington attempted to assert jurisdiction over a corporation whose contact with that  state was 
limited to the selling of its goods. See id.  In addressing the metaphysical problem of defin- 
ing corporate presence the Court wrote: 
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon 
as  though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its "presence" without, as  
well as  within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in 
its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say tha t  the corporation is so far 
"present" there as  to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the 
maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question t.o be de- 
cided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely to symbolize those activi- 
ties of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of due process. 
Id. a t  316-17 (citations omitted). 
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risdiction. For many years before International Shoe, lower courts 
had been moving away from a territorial approach toward a more 
expansive view of jurisdiction.91 In International Shoe, literal pres- 
ence within the forum was replaced by the notion that  under the 
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, certain contacts with 
the forum justified jurisdiction.92 
2. The Illusion that Contacts Jurisdiction Is Not About the 
Allocation of Regulatory Authority 
Today, as evidenced by the question before this Symposium, 
courts93 and commentatorsg4 operating within the new contacts 
91 Before the development of minimum contacts, state assertions of jurisdiction over cor- 
porations were based on the fiction that corporations had consented impliedly to the jurisdic- 
tion of every state where they conducted business. In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855), and St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882), the Supreme Court held 
that  a state could condition a corporation's right to do business within its borders on its con- 
sent to the personal jurisdiction of that state. See Lafayette, 59 U.S. a t  407; St.  Clair, 106 
U.S. a t  356. The Court attempted to use the concept of implied consent to get around the 
limitations of territoriality in several other areas as well. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 
U.S. 352 (1927) (approving a state statute subjecting nonresident motorists to personal juris- 
diction for in-state accidents based on a theory of implied consent). The obvious problem 
with this approach is that it was based on what Professor Ronald Dworkin calls "counter- 
factual consent," meaning that there is, in fact, no consent. Ronald Dworkin, Why Effz- 
ciency?: A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 575 (1980) 
(demonstrating that  the argument that "I would have consented had I been asked . . . pro- 
vides no reason in itself for enforcing against me that to which I would have (but did not) 
consent"). 
92 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. a t  316. For an excellent and detailed textbook exami- 
nation of the U.S. minimum contacts doctrine as developed through subsequent case law, see 
RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 923-1052 (7th ed. 1997). 
93 Four Supreme Court cases have dealt with assertions of jurisdiction over foreign defen- 
dants. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Na- 
cionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com- 
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 
342 U.S. 437 (1952). Asahi presented a jurisdiction question where both parties were for- 
eign. See Asahi, 480 U.S. a t  106. In all of these cases, the Court simply assumed that the 
U.S. domestic law of jurisdiction was applicable. Of course, the United States is not pres- 
ently party to a jurisdictional treaty that would be applicable, but the Court failed to con- 
sider the possibility that other sources of international law-specifically custom-might ap- 
ply. Courts assumed that the international law of jurisdiction applied to international 
jurisdiction during the territorial era, despite their being no jurisdictional treaty. For a more 
detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's failure to consider applying the international law 
of jurisdiction to international cases, as  well as the existence of a possible jurisdictional role 
for custom, see Strauss, supra note 8, a t  383-87,389. 
94 Several commentators have argued that in cases involving foreign defendants or fed- 
eral assertions of jurisdiction, the United States as a whole, rather than a particular state 
within it, should be considered the relevant sovereign with which a defendant must have 
minimum contacts. These commentators have all assumed that it is the U.S. Constitution 
rather than international law that prescribes this jurisdiction. See generally, e.g., Born, su- 
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framework no longer assume that the international order should 
prescribe international jurisdiction. Rather, to  the contrary, they 
assume that the Constitution prescribes the contacts that are nec- 
essary for assertions of jurisdiction. This is equally true whether 
the assertion of jurisdiction is by one of the fifty states who collec- 
tively operate as constituent units of the American federation or 
whether it is by the United States as a whole operating as a part of 
the international order. 
Where does this assumption come from? There are two common 
underlying illusions about contacts jurisdiction. These illusions 
give rise to  this assumption that international jurisdiction is no 
longer about the international question of the allocation of author- 
ity between the constituent subunits of the international system. 
First, the fact that contacts jurisdiction allows for nation-states to  
have overlapping jurisdictional realms obscures the fact that juris- 
diction continues to  be about the allocation of authority. Under the 
territorial scheme, because jurisdiction was mutually exclusive- 
assigned only to the one forum where the defendant was present- 
quite obviously a finite reserve of regulatory power was being allo- 
cated among states. But under contacts jurisdiction, defendants 
potentially have requisite contacts with multiple forums, each of 
which possess the simultaneous power to  exercise jurisdiction in a 
given case. The existence of non-exclusive, overlapping jurisdiction 
creates the impression that administrative power does not need to 
be allocated among nation-states. Jurisdiction, one might come to 
assume, must be about something other than the international allo- 
cation of administrative authority. Nevertheless, it is essential to  
remember that jurisdiction remains about what jurisdiction always 
has been fundamentally about: the allocation of sovereign author- 
ity. Even overlapping and non-exclusive jurisdictional realms serve 
to distribute administrative authority. 
At an even more fundamental level, contacts doctrine, as formu- 
lated by the U.S. Supreme Court, denies that the Court, in author- 
izing states within the United States to exercise authority outside 
their traditional territorial confines, was engineering a transforma- 
- -- - 
pra note 9; Brian B. Frasch, National Contacts as a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction Over 
Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CAL. L. REV. 686 (1982); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitu- 
tional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in  the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U .  L. REV. 1 
(1984); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 
(1983); Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the 
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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tion of state jurisdictional powers.95 Rather, under the Supreme 
Court's formulation, state jurisdictional powers do not change. In- 
stead, the state's ability to  assert jurisdiction extraterritorially is 
premised upon the agreement of out-of-state defendants to  acqui- 
esce to state powers.96 Because contacts jurisdiction under this 
formulation is not about empowering the state to exercise new ju- 
risdictional powers, contacts doctrine applied internationally brings 
with it no new power to, in fact, be allocated by the international 
order. 
The Supreme Court adopted this formulation because it did not 
appear to  believe that it could alter the basic territorial powers of 
the state. The reasons for this probably lie in history and in psy- 
chology. The state, and especially the popular conception of it as a 
territorially-defined sovereign entity, has not been just a political 
convention of the modem world. Since the emergence of the nation- 
state after the Thirty Years War in 1648,97 humankind has been so 
psychologically wedded to the idea of the territorially sovereign 
state as to have turned it into a kind of religious icon.98 The abso- 
95 See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 696 (1987) (explaining that rather than reworking the 
Pennoyer-era conceptions of jurisdiction, the contacts doctrine just recognizes that "a sover- 
eign may form a relationship with an individual that supplements the sovereign's internal 
regulatory authority," thus justifying jurisdiction). 
96 See Strauss, supra note 8, a t  399 (stating that  "[dloctrine-makers, however, believing 
that the state's territorial jurisdictional character was immutable, rationalized contacts ju- 
risdiction with the notion of consent") (footnote omitted). 
97 This is the date most accepted for the development of the modern nation-state. For a 
discussion of this development, see generally ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
THE LAW OF NATIONS (rev. ed. 1954). 
98 The supernatural basis of the state is reflected in the concept of the divine right of 
kings who were closely identified with the state itself. The writings of Jean Bodin, who is 
often considered the intellectual father of the modern nation-state, reflect this understand- 
ing: 
Since there is nothing greater on earth, after God, than sovereign princes, and since 
they have been established by Him as His lieutenants for commanding other men, we 
need to be precise about their status (qualit&) so that we may respect and revere their 
majesty in complete obedience, and d& them honor in our thoughts and in our speech. 
Contempt for one's sovereign prince is contempt toward God, of whom he is the earthy 
image. 
JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 46 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans. 1992). 
Starting in the latter part of the eighteenth century, international law generally took a 
positivist turn away from theism, but intense devotion to the state and the concept of state- 
hood still remains a dominant factor in international social life. Richard Falk has recently 
written: 
[Slovereignty and statehood remain a normative horizon for most peoples in the world, 
especially for those who are victimized, and provides the outer limit for the most collec- 
tive of rights, the self-determination of peoples. The persisting vitality of sovereignty as  
a normative ideal reflects the power of nationalism as the decisive basis of political 
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lutist formulation of the state as an immutably defined territorial 
entity is reflected in Chief Justice John Marshall's famous 1812 
declaration in Schooner Exchange v. MYFaddon:99 
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is nec- 
essarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limi- 
tation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriv- 
ing validity from an external source, would imply a 
diminution of its sovereignty to  the extent of the restriction, 
and an investment of that sovereignty to  the same extent in 
that power which could impose such restriction.loO 
With the arrival of the contacts era, the Justices of the Supreme 
Court, operating as the high priests of this secular religious tradi- 
tion, seem to  have simply assumed that it was beyond their power 
to  alter the fundamental territorial character of the fifty 
"sovereign" united states.101 Instead of simply expanding the pow- 
ers of these states to allow for contacts jurisdiction, they evidently 
felt it necessary to invent a formulation which only allowed the 
states to assert jurisdiction if "there be some act by which the de- 
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac- 
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro- 
community. This power is expressed through patriotic fervor, ranging from victory in 
sports organized as competition among countries, to participation in war for the defense 
of the homeland. Sovereignty embodies the moral, legal, and political claims of nation- 
alism a t  the state level, establishing its strong symbolic and substantive presence in 
world order thought and practice, while providing the decisive link between "self' and 
"other" in international political life. 
RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE: TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL POLITICS 80 (1995) 
(footnote omitted). 
99 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
100 Id. a t  136. 
101 The basic formulation in International Shoe and its progeny assumes that the state 
has the intrinsic power to exercise territorial jurisdiction, but that  only through conceptual 
machinations which do not alter the basic territorial character of the state can non- 
territorial assertions of jurisdiction be justified. 
Specifically, these cases do not redefine straightforwardly the basic territorial character of 
the state by proclaiming simply a new jurisdictional entity with altered powers. Rather, in 
assuming the state's intrinsic territorial character, jurisdiction is justified as "fair" if the de- 
fendant has "contacts, ties, or relations" to that predefined territorial entity. International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). See generally Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdic- 
tional Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 308 (1987) (supporting the 
notion that  territorial powers simply are assumed). While the Supreme Court's conceptuali- 
zation of the rationale for contacts jurisdiction has not been completely consistent, see infra 
notes 102, 110, the basic assumption that the state is intrinsically territorial has not 
changed. 
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tections of its laws."102 Thus, the state could remain exclusively 
territorial and yet exercise jurisdiction over defendants who had in 
some way independently acquiesced to its power.103 The Supreme 
Court, in endorsing this new jurisdiction, was, despite the pretense 
of maintaining territoriality, altering fundamentally the nature of 
state power. In reality, the state's powers were being expanded to 
cover situations where the defendant had extraterritorial contacts 
with the state, and it did not matter whether the defendant actu- 
ally accepted this power. Tracking a development that had been 
taking place for a long period of time in prescriptive jurisdiction,l04 
the state was losing its exclusively territorial dimension.105 No 
102 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (emphasis added); see Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (stating that a defendant who establishes a contrac- 
tual relationship with a plaintiff in a forum state purposefully avails himself of the forum 
state's laws); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) 
(explaining that personal jurisdiction was not properly asserted over defendants whose prod- 
uct finds itself in the forum state, but who have availed themselves of none of the privileges 
and benefits of the forum state's law); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) 
(holding that a father who allowed his child to spend time with the mother in California had 
not purposefully availed himself of California law). Synthesizing all of the post-International 
Shoe personal jurisdiction cases to determine the exact extent to which this purposeful 
availment formulation has prevailed is complex and beyond the scope of this Article, but 
Kevin M. Clermont in his very influential work, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue 
for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL . REV. 411 (1981), concluded, "by aggregating the 
case law," that jurisdiction "exists over a defendant who has purposefully availed himself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state." Id. a t  424; see 1 ROBERT C. 
CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CML ACTIONS 5 2.05 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the importance of 
purposeful availment). 
103 In justifying contacts jurisdiction without altering the fundamental territorial charac- 
ter of the state, the Supreme Court was faced with a major conceptual dilemma. By defini- 
tion, an  entity whose jurisdiction is to remain territorially defined cannot assert jurisdiction 
extraterritorially. The Court, however, found a solution. The conceptual problem is avoided 
to the extent that the offshore defendant can be conceived to have independently submitted 
to the forum. See Brilmayer, supra note 101, a t  306 (affirming the importance of consent in 
the Court's jurisdictional analysis, Brilmayer notes that "[iln keeping with consent as a basis 
for assertion of authority, the Court has on numerous occasions emphasized the importance 
of the defendant's awareness or intent to submit to jurisdiction"). For Brilmayer's more in- 
depth discussion of the political theory supporting consent a s  a basis for personal jurisdic- 
tion, see generally LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAI, ACTS (1989). 
104 Prescriptive jurisdiction is defined by the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS as the 
authority of a state "to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of per- 
sons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, 
by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court." RESTATEMENT OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 30, $401(a). 
105 The RESTATEMENT lists four primary bases for prescriptive jurisdiction in addition to 
territoriality: "Effects principle" ("jurisdiction with respect to activity outside the state, but 
having or intended to have substantial effect within the state's territory"); "Nationality, 
domicile, and residence" (jurisdiction to prescribe the activity of a state's own nationals or of 
those who are domiciled or residing within it even when they are not within its territorial 
boundaries or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction); "protective principle" ("the right of a state 
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longer did state jurisdiction (either for states within the United 
States or for the nation-states of the world) begin and end with the 
state's territorial boundaries.lo6 Contacts jurisdiction meant a re- 
definition of the powers of both the states within the United States 
and of the nation-states of the world, and, as we have seen under 
the constitutionally reflected sovereignty paradigm, it is the domain 
of the international order to  oversee the allocation of such new 
powers among nation-states. lo7 
Contacts jurisdiction's nonexclusive, overlapping jurisdictional 
realms and the Supreme Court's denial that such jurisdiction in- 
volved expanding state powers caused jurisdiction in the contacts 
era to appear to  lose its raison d'etre-the allocation of regulatory 
authority. Jurisdiction was not, however, to  be left by courts and 
commentators as an empty procedural vessel without an underlying 
rationale. And so into the conceptual void (courtesy of the per- 
ceived need to  look to the acquiescence of defendants to  rationalize 
extraterritorial jurisdiction) came a new jurisdictional mission- 
protecting the rights of defendants. The Court in Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de GuineelOB articulated it 
most strongly. That personal jurisdiction can be waived by the de- 
to punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its territory by persons who are not 
its nationals [for] offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threat- 
ening the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as  crimes by de- 
veloped legal systems"); "passive personality principle" (the right of a state to "apply law- 
particularly criminal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its na- 
tional where the victim of the act was its national"); "Universal" principle (jurisdiction "to 
define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations 
a s  of universal concern, such as piracy, [or the1 slave trade" even where no other basis of ju- 
risdiction exists). Id. § 402, cmts. c-g, 5 404. 
The territorial basis of prescriptive jurisdiction has declined most notably in favor of the 
effects doctrine a s  a basis for jurisdiction. As nation-states throughout the Post-World War 
I1 period have become increasingly interdependent, they are more subject to the effects of 
activities that take place on foreign soil. The international legal basis for their attempts to 
regulate those offshore activities is the effects doctrine. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE 
WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21~~-CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991) (explaining 
that territorial boundaries have become increasingly irrelevant in the age of globalized pro- 
duction). 
106 In fact, despite Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Schooner Exchange to the con- 
trary, even during the territorial era, absolute territorialism was too confining to fully meet 
the regulatory needs of the international order. See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DO- 
MESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 30 (1964) ("[Als Marshall was ready to 
acknowledge and to apply in Schooner Exchange, the fundamental spatial allocation must be 
modified to accommodate many situations of interaction between states."). 
107 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
personal jurisdiction and the sovereignty paradigm as it is reflected in the U.S. Constitu- 
tion). 
10s 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
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fendant,log declared the Court, ''portray[sI it for what it is-a legal 
right protecting the indi~idual."~~O More accurately stated, the con- 
venience of litigating in a particular forum for defendants was the 
primary111 (though not only)l12 criterion used to allocate authority 
109 The Court also pointed to the fact that the defendant can be estopped from raising the 
jurisdictional issue to support its conclusion that persona1 jurisdiction is a legal right pro- 
tecting the individual. See id. at  704. 
110 Id. While a concern with the rights of defendants has dominated the contacts era ju- 
risdictional discourse and has shaped the contacts era understanding of the jurisdictional 
mission, other concerns have also been articulated by the Court as relevant to personal ju- 
risdiction. The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson identified these as fol- 
lows: 
[Tlhe forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in ob- 
taining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately pro- 
tected by the plaintiffs power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's inter- 
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of 
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations omitted); see 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223- 
24 (1957). 
The extent to which these other criteria, sometimes referred to as "sovereignty concerns," 
are important remains unclear in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Patrick J. Borchers, 
Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European Community: Les- 
sons for American Reform, 40 AM. J .  COMP. L. 121 (1992). Professor Borchers states: 
International Shoe appeared to endorse the position that personal jurisdiction is a 
matter of individual entitlement, rather than a mechanism for resolving the compet- 
ing claims of sovereigns. Over the course of the next forty-six years, however, the 
Court revived, [andl dismissed. . . Con several occasions] a 'sovereignty' factor in the 
jurisdictional calculus. This uneven conceptualization has made for erratic naviga- 
tion. 
Id. at  126 (footnotes omitted). 
To the extent that these other factors are deemed important, exactly how they combine 
with concerns over defendants' rights to create a coherent doctrine is also unclear. The Su- 
preme Court, in Hanson u. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), and other decisions, has interpreted 
International Shoe's statement that the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with a 
forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice," as establishing two separate tests: a minimum contacts test and a 
fair play and substantial justice test. See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. a t  258-59 (Black, J., dis- 
senting) (discussing the fair play and substantial justice test). The minimum contacts test 
has in various decisions been understood to be the guardian of defendants' rights, while the 
fair play and substantial justice test has been regarded as balancing the other relevant con- 
cerns with the interests of the defendant. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at  113 (discussing the 
"several factors" that go into a "determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of juris- 
diction"). The Supreme Court, because of a lack of internal consensus, has been unable to 
state definitively the relationship between these two tests. For further discussion of these 
two tests and the role of "sovereignty" factors, see generally Kevin M. Clermont, supra note 
102. 
111 See Stein, supra note 95, at  690. 
From 1877 to 1945, inappropriate assertions of jurisdiction were viewed not as mere in- 
fringements on a defendant's freedom, but as violations of the sovereignty of other 
states. The last forty years, however, have witnessed an erosion of this political ele- 
ment. Jurisdictional doctrine currently focuses solely on the relationship between the 
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for forum courts to hear civil disputes in the contacts era. With the 
jurisdictional purpose hidden from view, however, all that re- 
mained visible in the jurisdictional exercise was the criterion that 
was used for allocating judicial power. It was, therefore, easy for 
the primary criterion for allocating such power to  become confused 
with the underlying purpose of jurisdiction. Following this substi- 
tution, this new "purpose" of jurisdiction came itself to  reinforce the 
perception that jurisdiction is unrelated to  the international order's 
domain of relations between nations. The focus on defendants, pri- 
vate actors who are subject to  domestic regulation under the para- 
digm, adds to  the appearance that jurisdiction should fall within 
the realm of domestic law. 
But by confusing criteria for allocating jurisdiction with the sub- 
ject matter of jurisdiction, courts and commentators have confused 
the fundamental question of when states can assert authority over 
private actors with their ability to  assert such authority once they 
have jurisdiction. The former, involving the distribution of the 
authority among the states to regulate private actors, is a matter- 
as we have seen-for the international order, while the latter, in- 
volving the use of that authority once granted to regulate private 
actors, is properly the domain of the domestic order. 
3. An Option To Decline Jurisdiction? 
Even if one accepts my argument that, under the Constitution, 
the international order governs relations between nation-states, 
and that international jurisdiction, including contacts jurisdiction, 
is about allocating authority between nation-states, we are not yet 
finished. Does not the Constitution, operating in accordance with 
the sovereignty paradigm, preserve the ability for the United States 
to  decline to  exercise its international grant of jurisdiction? This is 
a crucial question because the most likely potential for perceived 
conflict between the Constitution and a jurisdictional treaty would 
be if jurisdiction over certain cases were to  be mandatorily assigned 
to  the United States, and acceptance of that assignment was seen 
defendant and the forum, and the legitimacy of the forum's assertion of jurisdiction de- 
pends exclusively on fairness to the defendant. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
112 See supra note 110 and accompanying text (identifying criteria, other than protecting 
defendants' rights, which are considered relevant to determinations of personal jurisdiction). 
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to  be inconsistent with the defendant's constitutional rights under 
the minimum contacts test.113 
There is no doubt that allowing for nation-states to  decline to  ex- 
ercise their grant of jurisdiction would be consistent with a certain 
jurisdictional scheme. Under such an approach, the international 
order would coordinate the distribution of regulatory authority by 
defining when assertions of jurisdiction would be allowed without 
requiring nation-states to  engage in such assertions. This semi- 
flexible system will be recognized as the personal jurisdictional 
scheme that has been adopted domestically for use among the 
states of the United States.114 
Another quite valid jurisdictional scheme, however, would man- 
datorily assign jurisdictional responsibilities to  nation-states. To 
the extent this approach is adopted in an international treaty, the 
constitutionalized convenience-of-defendants criterion for allocating 
jurisdiction among the states of the United States should not be in- 
terpreted as encroaching on the domain of the treaty. Any confu- 
sion in this regard is just another variation on the basic confusion 
about what is appropriately domestic, and what is international, in 
the age of contacts jurisdiction. The constitutionalized convenience- 
of-defendants criterion's sole purpose is to determine jurisdiction. If 
the Framers of the Constitution did not intend for the document to  
govern international jurisdiction, then they likewise did not intend 
for its criteria for granting jurisdiction to be applied internation- 
ally. That such criteria may be deemed to be very important-even 
fundamental-is not the same as to say it insinuates itself into the 
international realm. 
In sharp distinction are situations that are established to  be 
within the Constitution's domain and where the constitutional pre- 
scriptions run counter to  those of the international order. An ex- 
ample would be a United States prosecution for an act of hate 
speech that transpired in such a way as to  be clearly within the 
realm of the Constitution's domain. This would lay the basis for a 
conflict between the First Amendment's guarantee of free speechl15 
113 For a discussion of what these might be, see Borchers, supra note 6, at  1164-73. 
114 See supra Part 1.B (discussing the American approach to personal jurisdiction). 
115 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances."); see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (upholding the 
constitutional right to engage in cross burning as an act of hate speech); National Socialist 
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and international law's arguable ban on hate speech.116 Under the 
American dualist approach to  the relationship between domestic 
and international law, the constitutional standards would prevail 
in U.S. Courts.117 AS we have seen, however, international jurisdic- 
tion by the Constitution's own terms is not within its domain. 
Hence, no conflict would present itself between the domestic crite- 
ria used to allocate jurisdiction and the international criteria used 
to  do the same. 
4. Good Constitutional Law Makes Good Policy 
Logical perhaps, but from a policy point of view are we really to 
deny "basic" constitutional protections to  defendants in interna- 
tional cases? Again, a clear understanding of jurisdiction in light of 
the sovereignty paradigm makes the policy arguments for allowing 
an international treaty to  govern international jurisdiction as com- 
pelling as are the constitutional arguments. The constitutional ar- 
guments are themselves, after all, driven by an attempt to  allocate 
power coherently between the domestic and international orders. 
In beginning this discussion, we should keep in mind that the 
Supreme Court's celebration of the convenience-of-defendants crite- 
rion as the dominant constitutional factor in jurisdictional analysis 
was not inevitable. No doubt it is a very important criterion for de- 
termining which state should have jurisdiction. Other criteria, 
however, exist as well,ll8 and the equation between defendants be- 
ing forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum and fundamental 
human rights violations is, as we have seen, a peculiar function of 
Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (upholding the constitutional right 
to engage in public marching as  an  act of hate speech). 
116 See generally Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of 
Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J .  INT'L L. 628, 640 (1997) (discussing provisions in international 
human rights instruments qualifying freedom of expression in the interest of what the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights terms "due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare") (footnote omitted). 
The United States adhered to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
subject to a reservation that the Covenant "does not authorize or require legislation or other 
action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association pro- 
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." S. EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23, a t  22 
(1992). 
117 See supra Part 1.A (discussing the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over interna- 
tional law in U.S. courts). 
118 See supra note 110 (identifying other criteria relevant to determining jurisdiction). 
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the need for territorial states to  justify jurisdiction outside of their 
territories. llg 
More specifically, what interests would be advanced by giving 
primacy to  the U.S. Constitution in case of conflict with a jurisdic- 
tion treaty? Insisting on the applicability of U.S. constitutional 
principles would most likely protect non-American defendants 
whose cases would be assigned to the United States under the 
treaty, but who, under the American minimum contacts test, would 
not be subject to  U.S. jurisdiction.120 Presumably these foreign citi- 
zens' own governments (in addition to our own) would have agreed 
to  the treaty. Any country that felt that the treaty did not ade- 
quately protect its citizens could decline to become a party. Would 
it really make sense for the United States to breach its obligations 
to  foreign countries and incur their wrath in the name of protecting 
such countries7 own citizens?121 
Of course the United States should extend fundamental human 
rights protections to  citizens regardless of the states from which 
they come, or  for that matter, regardless of any treaty to the con- 
trary.122 Realistically, however, a jurisdiction treaty would be ex- 
tremely unlikely to have onerous provisions which would violate, in 
119 See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (discussing emphasis on defendants 
rights as a response to the need to justify extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
120 A situation where the treaty required the United States to take jurisdiction over an 
American citizen that it otherwise would not have under U.S. constitutional principles would 
be very unlikely to emerge. This is for the simple reason that the U.S. Constitution provides 
for the United States to assert jurisdiction over its own citizens. See Blackmer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (holding that nationality or citizenship provides a basis for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction). That states have the power to assert personal jurisdic- 
tion over their own domiciliaries goes back to the holding in Pennoyer u. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 
734 (1877). See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (holding that an individual 
is subject to personal jurisdiction in a state where he or she is domiciled). 
121 The policy arguments against the United States refusing a direct assignment of juris- 
diction are even stronger if one considers the probable results of such a refusal. Quite likely, 
there would be no forum to hear the dispute since other treaty parties would not want to 
countenance an American violation of the treaty with a violation of their own. The resulting 
situation would be worse than if the treaty provision did not exist in the first place, and 
could probably only be resolved through diplomacy, which could become rather contentious. 
122 In fact, international law under the principle of jus cogens most likely requires states 
not to give force to a treaty in violation of fundamental human rights. This principle holds 
that some norms of international law are superior in status and cannot be affected by a 
treaty. Most commentators believe that the protection of fundamental human rights is 
among these norms. See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 
AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993) (explaining how and why fundamental human rights principles 
have taken on the status of jus cogens). For the codification of the principle of jus cogens, see 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, re- 
printed in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). 
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any real sense, the fundamental human rights of defendants. 
Rather, to  the extent of inconsistency with our own Constitution, 
the treaty parties (including the United States if it signs the treaty) 
would simply have weighed the criteria for determining which fo- 
rum should hear a dispute slightly differently than have our own 
courts in constitutionalizing the minimum contacts test. All state 
parties to  the treaty, after all, have the same basic interest in cre- 
ating an international judicial system that will allow civil disputes 
to  be resolved effectively and judgments t o  be satisfied. Given the 
strong constitutional and policy reasons for deferring what is prop- 
erly international to  the international realm, only a certain xeno- 
phobia can weigh for insisting on insinuating our own domestic 
principles into a realm where they do not belong. 
The negotiation and successful implementation of a Hague Con- 
vention on jurisdiction and satisfaction of judgments would be a 
very positive international development. It would not only help 
improve the functioning of the international judicial system, but 
would also help further the grander aim of creating a more coherent 
international order. If the international community were success- 
fully to conclude such a jurisdiction treaty, and the United States 
were to accede to it, how unfortunate it would be if doctrinal confu- 
sion were to stand in the way of its successful implementation. 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution understood where America 
ends and the international order begins. It is now more important 
than ever that our courts correctly apply this understanding to pre- 
sent-day jurisdictional circumstances. Otherwise, they risk sabo- 
taging globally cooperative efforts to construct an international ju- 
dicial system which can meet the demands of the twenty-first 
century global economy. 
